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Summary 
'I he au thus· rliSC'IJS.~e.~ the problem of segmt'.utuc.l os "entrenched" electOral 
s}'lltems, which arc nol \\ic.lcly known or applied in the electoral psoctiCI' o f 
democ1 atie <>tate.'\. However, in the pv:.~~·uollllullist !'.IJ\te<> of Eastern Europe 
they have come tu the forefmnL Their main purpose i:. to combine the princi-
ple.'> of the majority and the propostion:t l elccmral systems as weU ~ tu both 
highhl!ht the advantage'> and mitiptc the sboru:uming> of both The main find-
ing or the studv is that there isn't a universal model o f relat.iu~ bcl\\cen 
!>egment(d electofal S)~tcms and parliamcnlllt) party S}""lem'- ~ted S)'$te~~?S 
ba\1: in 1.ome wuntrio pmduced the effcas of me m.aJunt} S)-"Stem and m 
othe"' of the proportional s\-:stems. l~titutianal factor!. causing those dtffc:rcnce 
cannot be p(~Slt~ly esL1btislled. -
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The concept and structure of segllJentcd electoral models 
Segmented e lectoral systems are not widely known ami have so far 
ht:eo relatively rarely applied in the history of democratic election '. In th!! 
Anglo-Saxon tradition they are usuaUy referred Lo as "mixed electoral sys-
tems'', whereas in lhe German tradition they are known as "die 
Grabensysteme ·•. 
They were most extensively discussed in Gt!nnany in the fifties and 
SL'! ties, when the existing c lcctoraJ system was about to undergo a reform. 
and Lui form of elections emerged IL'- a reform option. The name re-
sul ted from the conviction that this electora l model cumbi·nes two pofitical 
principles separated by a huge gap, a " tTench" ("der Grahcn"). The 
majCJTity and the proportional systems rcprt:sent "two entirely different 
concepts of the stale as a whole , particularly of lhe nature and the 
purpose of the parliament , of the kind of people's participation which 
have been juxtaposed" (Sternberger, 1964, 139). In this context, 
I Thi:> paper was wriuen during the author's vi:,it to the Institute for Political 
Science. Uoivcr:,ity of Heidelberg, h~ed on lhc resenrch grant of the Gcnnun 
foundation Alexander von HumbolL 
Kasaoow:, 'A.. Segmented ot ·~· ~ Pulol. ...-o, VOl. XXXII. (19:9!>), '4o 5, po. 1n-166 
1epresentation principles of the majority 
amhitetical, and therefore no compromise 






The segme nted model is an e lectoral pattern allcnlpting to combine 
two goals: the repre ·cntaLinn of all political tendencies, which should be 
guaranteed by propot1ional e lections, ami the creation of parliamentary 
majority c<~pablc of forming the government, which shoulu be guaranteed 
by the majority elections. Such an nption resulted from its very stmeture 
which incorporates the main structural elements of the majority and the 
proportional e lectoral sy:-> tcm that affect the politica l results of elect ion:-: 
s ingle-mandate and multi-mandate con'\tilucne-ics, cu111petition of individual 
candidates and party lists, decisio n-making based on both the majority and 
the proportional prmciple. 
In atx:ordance Wtlh such a structure. the segmented electoral model IS 
supposed to highlight the adva ntag~ and avoid or mitigate tbe .;hortt:um -
ings of both basic types of electoral \)"tern . This " as the main mtention 
uf it~ advocate .. This model was supposed to encourag\! partlt!.\·movements 
and honorary parties to develop into modem political parties, which will 
play dominant parts in the elccliun-. at the same time avoiding a com-
plt::te tlepersonnlizntion of elections by introducing single-mandate constitu-
encies2 it was as well supposed to allow sma U parties to take part in 1 he 
electio ns and enter the parliament, but al ·o to encourage concentratio n of 
political parlit::s and parliamentary party systems; furthermore to cn11ble 
the voters to expres · their prim my anti secondary political preference by 
means of the two-vote voting mechanism, but also provide them with a 
clear choice ht!Lwccn the leading party and the opposition; fi nally to 
''JUStly" distribute parliamentary ea t-. among political parties according to 
the number of votes gained from voters, b ur also "reward", in term!. nf 
mandates, 1he party gaining tJu: mo 1 votes. 
PoliticalJy speaking, the segmented mode~ j, generally viewed as a 
L'nmpromist! between the party in power and the opposition. However. thi!. 
is not always the ct'\e. Tn the muntri~ of 'Eastern Europe it bas often 
reflected insecurity expressed by the leading politic<tl furccs a.'\ tn which 
2 11. Meyer showed thar the pcr.-;onnl l'limension of c lecLiuns vani:>hctl !>imulta-
neouc;ly with their local dimension, i.t:. with the cbaoged significance of locnl con-
slilueucies. The local character of mAjority elections a.~ well as Lbcir pclliOnttl di-
me nsion is suppressed in favour of Lhc imporlnuce of lhe ele.clion procedure for 
tht: coustitution of the parliame nt ns well as for e lccuon odds of Lhc purlics. 
Majority elections gradually cc.asctl to pcrfot m their primary function of represeot-
iug local units, as political parties got more nnd better cfevelopcd and suprurc-
gionally organized. us ideological w1t.l ~uprurcgioual inLeresrs prevailed over local. 
~ functions of the centralist parliament muiLiplied and a.; more attention wa.o, 
paid 10 its party structure. Political parties "mediated" lhc important.-c of the 
constituency as well as the importance of lhc local and personal dimensions ot 
majority e lcctiorn; (Mcycr, 1973, 162). 
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electoral system would be bt:~l suited to their interests and would provide 
them with a new electoral victory. As H result of such doubts segmented 
electoral systems ~.:merged , which provided the political forces in power 
with a lot of maneuvering space, primarily in terms of reducing t·hc op-
position's e lectic.m chances. For example, in Crmtlia t11e segmented elec-
toral model seemed to be, furmally . peaking, an expression uf the com-
promise between the party in power and the uppo iLion: the leading party 
came into power through majority elections. which, since it was the 
<;trongc)>t political party, remained heM suited to its potitical int crc!.ts. 
while :~II npp<1sition parties advocated the prup<lrlional electoral system. 
The choice of the segmented electoral model was based on the political 
estimate of the party in power thllt its e lectoral victory might be threat-
ened if faced with a united opposition in majority e lections. ThEs was 
o;upported by the fact that the electoral system of relative majority, which 
was upp<1sed to be used for the S&'Ond parliament bouse, was replaced 
by the proportional electoral system in small (three-mandate) coostiruencies 
only ten days before the e lection . . TI1e change was motivated by the an-
nouncement madt: by the opposition that they would form a unified elec-
toral bloc against the party iu power in the elections for Lhat parliameo-
Lary body. 
Segmented electoral models ol East European countries 
Segmented electural model came into the fo refront in clcctioru held in 
p<l t-communist countries of Elt..-tem Europe. 1\mong eighteen state ' it 
\\'aS applied in a. many as in seven: Albania, Rulgaria, Croatia, Yugosla-
via, Lithuania, Hungary aml Russia. ln two countries it was applied only 
in the first free elections: BulgariH ( 1990) aod Yugoslavia (May 1992), 
only to he ahundnned in the following pretermed clect.inns in both being 
replaced by the proportional electoral system. Jn Albania , on the other 
hand, Ule segmented electoral model was introduced in the second eJec-
tions (1992) after t11e system of absolute majority wa." abandoned, which 
was used in the fir t organized elections (1991) (Sz:ijakowski, 1991; Hoppe, 
1992). Segmented electoral model was also applied in Croatia in the sec-
ond ( 1992) and the third elections (1995) after the S}"'tcm of absolute 
majority was abandoned, which was u ed in the first organized free eJec-
tions in 1990 when Croatia had not yet hccome an independent state. 
1 Bosuia and Hcrcegovinn wn~ not includct.l in tlu.: aualysis, because since its 
proclnimec1 independence elections could not be held clue r.o the war. The anuly-
si!. indut.lc~ only elections in indepenc1ent tales. i.e. election~ ou tbe oatio01al and 
not subnational level. The fin.t free elections in Bosnia aoc1 ller7egovina were 
held in ~o,cmbcr of 1990. when iJ wa" <;t ill formally a part of the Yugosla" 
federation. The elections were organizct.l uccordiug to Lbe proport«lnal electoral 
~tern for the lower bouse of parliament WJd for t.he upper bou e of parlhuncot 
t.hey were held according to tltc absolute majoriry 1\y<;tem. 
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The first and t h~; . econd free elections in Ru!-..,ia ( 1993, 1995) were 
organized in accordance with the s~:gmented electoral model (Schneider, 
1993; Mikhailovl>kaia and Kuzminsk~ 1994; Wyman et al., 1994), and so 
were those in Lithuania ( 1992) when it became an independent state 
(Lucky, 1994). This model was u ed in both the fi rst (1990) and the sec-
ond (1994) election. only in Hungary (K6r6senyi, 1990; Arato, J 994) 
(Table 1). 
TtJb/e 1: Distribu tion of elt!ctoral model type in Gastern European 
coun tries 1990 1994 (*) 
··.···. ·,._ ~ 
El®tontl Mot.lds ~ ;;c 
:States Majority ·'·:Pr.o~rlional .,;;,Segmented 
Albania .. • 
Belorussia • 
Bulgaria . ~ 
Chech Republic • 
Estonia • 
Croatia ... 













(") c lccLOraJ mouc;Js for the first parliament houses in States witb bicamcrul 
~terns 
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Segmented electoral mm.ldl in Eastern E urope differed quite signifi-
cHntly. The first difference concemecl lht! type of the majority e lectoral 
pattern within lhc mudels. In three sta tes (Croatia, Yugoslavia. Russia) 
the egmented e lectoral model emhrnccu e lections by re lative majori ty and 
proportional e lections. In the four o ther states (Aib.-nia, Bulgaria, Lithua-
nia and H ungary) it combined dcctions by absolute majority and prupm-
tiomtl clcclions. 
1\no the r d ifference results from various structura l e lements uf the rro-
po r1io na l e lectoral pattern. The difference was mostly refl ected in the size 
of constituencies, in lht: level of the electo ra l threshold ami Lhe met.l1od 
of calculating votes into mandntcs. 
Regarding lhc constituency size, t\vo subtypes emcrgcu; a t-large system, 
according to which lhe whole s tate represenrs only one electoral unit 
(Albania, Croatia, Latvia and Ru ·ia) and M:vcral plurillominal constituen-
cies (Bulgaria, Yugo lavia4 and Huo!tary). 
In all these states without exception the elecwral threshold was legaJ.ly 
prescriheu e iLLier on the national level o r on con,titucm:y lt!vel. Although 
doubts about the compatibility of the threshold with the basic principle nf 
proportional e lections were more nr lc i.. overcome,5 its legitimacy in the 
segmcnlcu decto ral model is more questionable. Supposing the main pur-
pose of the e lectora l threshold in "comple te'' proportional e lections is lo 
prevt:nt overf ragm enta tion of the party and p arliamentary systems, in the 
se&'111ented model this is done primarily by majori ty e lections. Therefore, 
the threshold is taking over the function of an additional mechanism for 
lhc reductio n of the parliamentary in favor of lhe e lective party system. 
J Yugosla~via somehow represented a special case due 10 1he fac1 Lhal two 
coo~litucm;ie:. in two federal units were e~tablished; in Serbia and Montenegro. 
1\s elections were held and their r~ul l.!. are shO'-''D separately, in my aoaly<:is I 
will usc the Serbian example because it ic; criticaJ for Yugo luvia: in Serbia lht:re 
were 6.9 million and in Montenegro ubout 430.000 voters. Serbia gave )()6 and 
Montenegro 30 maudaLes in the lower houc;e of the Federal Purliument 
(VasoviC/Goati. 1W3, 226). 
s fhe opponent!. of Llle electoral threshold claimed thai it strengthen:. the 
party iu power and weakens the influence of smaller parties, prevents the eslab· 
lishmen1 of new parties unt.l Lhu:. petrifies the exist.ing parties and parliamentary 
sy:;Lcms buviog a uegnlivc impact on the developmenl of modem sm;icty in gen-
eral. Furthermore, 1 hey claimet.l lhul lhc threshold rest• ni.os equality and justice 
that the lawmukcrs proclaim through the plurality elecroral system, and Lhat it i:. 
"counter 10 lhe system and unjust" (Sternberger, J965, 165). Advocates of thai 
mccbanil;m rejct:tcd those objections claiming thaL 1hey were a result of "puri:.t 
interpretalion of proportional clcclions", wbicb lead to no absurd situation (Jesse, 
1985. 238). The electoral threshold is an institutional mechanism by which go,'-
emmenl stability is protected from lhrealo; Lhal could c.:omc from smaU parliameo-
t.ury parties, it increases the concentration of poljtical forces and it represents 
some kind of comproomc between the proportional and majority principle:~. 
178 
In the states with the nt-largc l>~tem, the electoral threshold varied 
from 3 to 5 percent. In the states which were divided into constituencies, 
the threshold varied between 4 and 5 percent. interestingly, in the 1995 
elections i11 Croatia differ~nt electoral thresholds for political parties (5 
percent) and electora l coalitions (8 to 11) were introduced, which was 
characlcrislic: of those East European countTic)\ Llwl selected the propor-
tional elector<~ I system. In Lbe second elections in Polaml ( 1993) the 
threshold of 5 percent was prescrihcd for parties and ~ percent for coali-
ttons (Twor,ccki, 1994); in former Czechoslovakia the h;vd of the thresh-
old was even more differentiated and the parties were expected to win at 
least 5 percent, coalitions of 2 and 3 partit!l 7 percent, coalitions of -l, 5 
and more parties as much as 10 percent of votes; in Rumania the 
threshold was 3 perc~nt and for coalitions up to 8 percent of vole'> 
(Lucky, 1994). Such a variety of e lectonll thresholds represented novelty in 
the e lectoral practice of democratic states and experts i:nterpn.:t it as oue 
of the rare forms of ''cre;ttive reproduction" of Western political institu-
tions in F.ast European countries after the fall of soda lism. 
Regardmg the methods uf calculating votes into mandates, D 'Ilondt's 
pn~~.:~dure dominated (Bulgaria, Croaria, Hungary in tenus of the division 
of "compen..,.llion" mandates). H owever, other methods of simple elcclnral 
number and simple quota were n'\Cll lt.\ wdl (Russia), Hagenbach-Bischoffs 
methml (Hungary) and Droop-Ouota (Lilhnania) Since the lauu three 
methods do not imply automatic distribution of aU mandates in the first 
procedure, they \vere supplemented hy the mclhml of the largest remain-
der a.ccon.ling to wlllch mandates were divided in tbe second Ji:-.tribution 
procedure. 
Beside:-. the stated differences, another factor diffc renciatcd segmented 
models. It is tbe numhcr of maudates won in majority and proportional 
t:lections. Generally speaking, segmented electoral mmlds varied in tem1s 
of levelling the majority and proportional princtple of repre.,cnl~tlitm or in 
~ving priority to one uf lhcm. Ir the:: majority and proportional principles 
were made equal. then lhe same numher of munclutes was obtained in 
majority and proportional elections (Bulgaria. Croatia 1992. Rw-.-.ia); if pri-
ority was gtven to the propc.Trtional principle, more parliamentary seats re-
su ltc::d from proportional e lections (Yugoslavia, Hnng<uy, Croatia 1995); fi-
Dlllly, if the majority principle outwei~bed rhe proponional princirle, more 
parliamentary seats resu lt ed from mujnrity elections (Aibanin, Lithuania) 
(Table 2). 
Poliricnl effect() of segmented eleclon-t! m·odcls 
The structure of '-t!grm:nted electoraJ models which have been applied 
in seven lated countries of Eastern Europe provides the ha"i" for some 
general hypotheses about their impact on Lhe party parliamentary system. 
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First, the politicaJ effect of segmented electoral models on parliamen-
tary party Y',lcm' is basically maJOritarian, which implic!. that there IS a 
significant dispropomon of vote' and mandates. 
Table 2: Relation hetwcen mandates in majority (single-mandate 
constituencies) and pro port iumtl dections (multy-maodate 
constit11cncics) (*) 
;:.:·.=.<· ~. '" :·r:= .. ,,.,c It "'"X~attor,: Si 1igJ~::i:I!~w b~r "·MpJti~:tn~mbcr 
State .. JS: '· mandates corutitu'Cncicr. oomtifu'encles-
Albania 140 100 .w 
Bulgaria 400 200 200 
Croatia 1992 120 60 60 
Croatia 1995 120 28 92 
Yurosh!Via 136 58 78 
Lithuania 141 71 70 
llungary 386 176 210 
Russia 450 225 225 
(•) Number of SC<LlS in the lower hou~c of parliament m Cruat.iu, Yugoslavia ~1nd 
Russia 
St:c()nd, di. proponions are created predominantly by the majority elec-
toral systems, with relative majurity d~clions having. a stronger impact 
than absolute maJOnty elections. 
Third, di,propurtions depended directly on lhe relations of the prupor-
uonal and majority principles within Lhe segmented electoral model. If the 
majority principle prevailed, the disproportion w.~' bigger. and if the pro-
ponional principle prcvailcd, the disproponion wa smaller. 
Fourth, mechanisms which we re huill in tht! proportional patterns, par-
tit.:ularly the type of the constituency and rhe level of tht: dcctoral 
threshold, contributed to disproportionate effects. Since aU cases involved 
large constituencies, including national conl'titnencies as well, the impact of 
this elemen t of the electoral system was significantly reduced. Therefore, 
the electoral threshold bad a s tronger impact on electoral results: the 
higher the threshold the smaller the number uf parliamentary parties and 
the bigger the di-.proportion of votes and party mandates which m;magt!d 
to reach the et thre hold. 
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ln Table 3 election n:.'>ults of the three strongest political parties 
(partie , coalitions and movements) in parli<tme11t" of seven Ea -t European 
countries in "'hich elections were held in accordance with the segmented 
pau ern are shown. 
Fin.t of aU, we should estabHsb - and this is not evident in the T a-
ble that the segmented clcctur.tl model in all the studied countries had 
a ignificant impact on the reduction of the e lective in favor of the par-
liamemary party .. y:.tem. Only three of tbe stated parties o r coalitions en-
tered the AJbanian parHament after the election<;, fnu r entered the BuJgar-
ian, five entered the Lithuanian, six entered the llungarian, seven the 
Croatian in 1992 and six in 1995, e ight the Yugos lavian and nine political 
parties or coa litions entered the Russian parliament." On the other hand, 
far more, dozens of political parties, groups and associations participated 
in the e lectio ns but did not manage to reach ueitbt:r the na tural e lectoral 
threshold that characterizes majori ty e lec6ons nor the legal threshold that 
has been b11ilt i11 proportional e lections. 
The starting hypothesis, according to which segmented e lectoral models 
act as majority e lections, i.e. result in a high disproportion of votes and 
seats was only partly confirmed . Majorilarian effect~ of elections were 
most . trongly pronounced in Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia, Ilungary and Croatia, 
and much less in Lithuania, Bulgaria and Albania. In countries with the 
strongest majoritarian effects, overrepresentation referred primarily to the 
winning parties and it was: in Yugosla\<ia/Serbia +25.9, in Hungary in 
1990 +18.0 and in 199.:l +21.1 , in Crnatia 1992 +16.9 and 1995 +13.9, 
in Lithuania +6.7, in Bulgaria +5.6 and in Albania +3.4 percen1. 
The pmitiun nf the .-.cc.:oml !>trongest parties varied from country to 
country. ln Hungary and Albania they were al'i<l -;lightly uvcrrcpn:scnted ( + 3 i.e. + 2.1% ), in Bulgaria the second party achieved a perfect propor-
tion and in Hungar)', Scrbiu anti Lithuania they were s)jghtly underrepre-
sented (about -2%). Croatia in 1992 was an e.nreme example of undcr-
rcprc~entation of the second strongest p arty which was as high as -8.3 %, 
but not in the 1995 election-;. 
On the other ha11d, Russia as a whole represented a case of its own. 
The first party was slightly underrepresented ( -0.6) and the second was 
extremely underrepresented (-1 2.0) and only the third party wa~ ovcrn:pre-
scuteu (+3.1). 
6 The few im.lepeudcut rcp1esentatives who entered the parliament through 
majority e lecti.oru;, representatives of elhnic minorities eleaed according to special 
election regulations as well as polilical parties who panicipalcd iu mHDllales witb 
less 1han 2 per cent, have nol been laken into accounL 
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Table 3: The shares of lhc three strongest purliameotary parties or conJitions 
m \>O les and mandatL>s I . fr d I I d I n:su liD!! om '\CI!TT colt: e ectora mo cs 
Stat~ .-~ %~Vot~· ~-
"' 
Mandares .... · 
Albania 
DcmotTdtic P:u1y 62.3 65.7 
Sociulil.t Pony 15.() 27.1 
Sociuldemocratic Parry ~.3 5.0 
Bulnria 
B ult:Jtriall Soc:i::ilist Party 47.2 52.8 
Unih:d Democratic Foro:s 36.2 36.0 
Movement for Ri!!hts and Ft ttdoms 6.0 5.7 
Croatia .. 
Croanun Democra tic Union <1<1.7 61.6 
45.2 59.1 
Croatian Sncial-L..ibcraJ !:'arty 17.7 9.-1 
11.6 12.5 
Croatian PartY of Rl)tlJ.Is 7. 1 3.6 
Coalition ot the Peasnnr, Po pular, Chri~liun Democratic 
18.2 20.0 
nod ReeionaJ parties 
Yugoslavia/Serbia• .. 
!iuctalli.t P:ury of Serbia no 68.9 
Serbian Radical PartY 30.0 28.0 
Democratic Umry of Voivodinian llunl!,&nans 3.0 2.0 
Lilhuauio 
Democratic Wo rkers Partv 45.1 51.8 
Sniudi.~ 21.7 J9.9 
Christian-democratic: Pam 12.9 11.8 
Huularv .. •• • 
I I u n .Prian Dcmocratit.: Forum 24.7 42.1 
11.7 9.11 
Union of Free Democmr-s 21.4 24.4 
19.7 17.9 
Huoltllrian Socialist Panv 109 8.5 
31.0 54.1 
Russia 
Russian Selection 17.8 17.2 
UbcruJ-den tc>er~ tic Partv 26.2 14.1 
l'c~alll Pany Q_'l 124 
• The shares of party 1i:.ts in WlteS in proportionul eld:tion<> 
• • Results o f the 199'1 elections iu C'roaria are shown in the first line, and that of the 1995 
elections arc :>hU\Io•u in the S«<nd line 
•• • Election reS11Iffi for lhe Parliament of Yugoslavia in Se1bia 
. ... Results of the 1990 elections in Hungary are ~hown in the first line, 11nd that of the 
1!1!14 d<'ClionK are shown in the second line 
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According to the political effects resulting from segmented electoral 
models in seven countries, East European party systt:ms ean he Jividt:d 
into two groups: 
a) systems in wh ich those models produced effects of majority elections 
and caused tlu:: crt:atinu of manufaetured majority parties in parliaments 
(Yugoslavia/Serbia, Hungary and Croatia), 
b) systems in which those modt:ls basically prmluet:LI effeets of propor-
tional elections and created earned majority parties in parliaments 
(1\lba nia, Bulgaria, Lithuania). /\lthougl.1 an absolute mandate majority of 
nne party was not estl-lhlished in the Russian parliament, Russia belongs 
to tbis group due to the proportional effects resulting from the segmented 
electoral rnot.lt:l. 
T his suprising review raised the foJJowing questions: What was, institu-
tionwise, the colllillon denominator of tbe first, and what of the secant.! 
gronp of countries? Whjch mechHnisms of segmented electoral models 
could have an impact on such po litical effects'! 
Considering the group of countries wltt:rt: majuriturian t:ffecl:s were 
produced, I here is hardly any common institutional factor that e.ause.d 
those effects. 1n Croatia and Yugoslavia segmented electoral models con-
sisted of rt:lative majority and proportional systems, and the Hungarian 
model consisted of absolute. majority and proportional systems. Therefore, 
the relative majority system was eliminated as a sufficit!nt factor for acat-
ing majoritaJi<m e ffect on the whole. Furthermore, in Hungary, Yugoslavia 
and Croatia 1995 the proportional p1inciple of representation predominated 
over the majority principle within the st:J:,rnlented elect-oral model, while in 
Croatia 1992 they were of equal significance. The disproportion was not a 
result o f the predomination of the majority over the proporliunal prind-
ple, which was a Iogic.tl starting hypothesis. Neither the size of constitu-
encies, nor the electoral threshold could have an in1portant role: in C roa-
tia there was only one national constituency with the lowt:st thrt:shold 
among all the studied coun11ies :-tnd both basica Uy fostered a higher de-
gree of proportional representation; in Yugoslavia there was actually an 
at-large system on a substate level and a legal LhreshoiJ which in Serhia, 
considering the size of the electorate, was not too high; in l lungary there 
were a few constituencies and one large national constituency with 58 
mandates as wt:ll as an aLiequatt:: legal threshold. Tn hrief, in the first 
group there were no institutional mechanisms within the se_!,mented elec-
toral models which would be collllllon to all the three states. The fact 
tl1a t in Lhi)o, b'Toup segmen ted model with relative majority systems pre-
vailed is indicative. 
L1 the second group of states, whert: proportional effects were hasically 
achieved, segmented elec.toral models differed accordingly. In Albania, Bul-
garia and Lithuania they c.;onsisted of the absolute majority aJtd propor-
tional systems and in Russia of the relative majority and proportional sys-
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tcms. The majority principle of representation was significantly prevalent in 
1\Jbania <md only slightly prevailing in Lithuania over the proportional 
principle. and in Bulgaria and Russia they were equally reprc ... ented. ln 
Albania. Lilhuania and Russia proportional elections \\ere held wirhin at-
large systems and in Bulgana they were held in a few plurinominal con-
stitUl:ucies. Differences between elecroml threshold were not si!:,rrlificant. 
Accordingly, there a re no institutional facto rs in thi!o. group which wuultl 
he common to »II lhe countries. In thi11 example the fact that in seg-
mented models absolute majority ystems prevailed and that within pro-
portional election patterns at-large '>-y'ilt:nt prev~ukd is highly indicative. 
Electoral rc ults and political polari7.ntions 
Since it is evident Lh»l party configurations were not onJy lhe r c.'>ull of 
the instituric.maJ factor, it is po ·ihh: to assume that their creation was in-
fluenced by their socio-cullural and cultural-pulitical background. In other 
words, ccrLaio political polarin1tion, the political divi!o.ion of the elector~1te, 
which characterizus some countrie · or groups of coumries had an impact 
on party relations. 
1) In mol\t of the analysed countries - particular!) in Albania, Bul-
garia, Yugoslavi<t and Lithuania - tbe cllit:f political polarization was 
formed around the axis sociali. rn-aoti-.ociahsm. The fact that before the 
collapse of the l\ocialist regime tbo ·e countries had no tradition of oppo-
sition antisocialist movemt:nts and groups and tht: fact that political polari-
zation of advocates and opponents of socialism became more evident prior 
to the first free elections and complett:ly a~1icuh1ted during the e lections, 
i<; a common deoomin»tur of these coumrie<;. Furthermore, in all tht:S~ 
counrries in the first free electioru., the communist o r left-win~ successor 
parties wo n. Thi' lead to the '"pre ervaLion" of cleavage"~ and their 
rept:aling in the second t.:lt:clions. However, in Lithuania communists did 
not win the first e lections, but thc.:n it was formally nut yet an independ-
ent state: despite. Lhe opposition's victory in the first elections this polari-
7<tlion was obviously "pn;served", which was confirmed by its presence in 
the second dection, although with t.lifferent results. An <ttldiLional indicator 
of the ~freezing" uf this political cleavage i'> the repeated victory of the 
succcsMir Socialist Party in the third elections in Bulg<1ria, in December of 
1994. 
Such type of poli tical polarization created pn::conditions for two-party 
compelilion in elections and a two-pa~ty parHamentary 1>ystem. In Albania 
7 Researcher of East European pany S} Lcms, almost with no cxccptionlt uote 
lhis k.ind of polarization but they call it differently although lhc content is equal 
or very sirnjlar: Communism-anticommunism (Roskin), lebolshevism-deholshcvi-
.wlion (Markus), lhe o ld regime-protransformutional regime ( Heymc), etc. 
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there are two main politic-al parties, the Democratic Party ami Lhe Social-
ist Party, which won in proportional clet:tions and not majority e lections 
with about 87 percent of the votes and earned about 93 percent of man-
dates. ln Bulgaria the Socialist Part) and the Union of D emocratic Forces 
won tugclher more than 83 percent of votes in proportional elections and 
earned more than 89 percent of mandates.s [n Yugo~lavia the nature uf 
political polarization was somewhat different and along with Romania it is 
the only counrry where the political change did not occur even after three 
election rounds in Serbia nod two rounds in Monlencbrn' and Yugoslavia . 
Neverthele. s. the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party 
together won 73% of votes in Serbia in proportional e lections ami shared 
97% of mandates. In Lithuania the D emocratic Labour Party and Sajudis 
wun together about 67% of votes in proportional e lections and earned 
abou t 72% of mandates. An additional im.licatur of the domination of the 
sta te tl type of oonfTont11tiun is the fact that parties and orga nizations of 
e thnic majorities in the respective states emerged as tlw third s tronge ·t 
politicnl groups: the " Mnvcrncnt fnr Rights and Freedoms" as the organi-
7.J-J litm of lhe Turkish minority in Uulgarin and the "Democratic Union of 
Vo ivodinian Hungarians" in Serbia; in Albania "Omani11", 1 he organization 
of the Greek mir10rity in Albania, was the third stronges t political force 
in the firs t e lections and in the Lithuanian parliament the " Poli.'h Union" 
was one the five re levant factors. 
In a ll tht:.\c cnuntries two-party parliamentary systems have been estab-
lished. At the same time. this fact refutes Klaus von Bcyme' assumptions 
tha t the establishment o f twn-pany system in Eastern Europe is impossible 
because there a re no basic prerequisites for this: majority electoral systems 
and articula ted divisions (1994, 313 it.!.). Political polarization a round the 
axis socia.lism - antiMJCialism, which also included other subpolarization 
t.limcn-;iun was so pronounced that in proportional e leclions it produced a 
large concentration of votes arountl two main political forces, which is 
othel'wise typical uf majority e lections. and two-party competition and a 
twn-pa r1y sy tern. 
(2) ln the second group nf countries (Hungary, Croatia and Russia) 
political polarization socia.Jism - antisocialism did not predominate: in the 
studied e lections, but due to different rt::asons. 
In Hungary basic tripolar polarizatio n was cre-ated in the first elections 
and il remained in the second, but with changed rdalions and results. In 
the fust elections the political dcava~;e socialism - antisocialism was not 
central as it. was in some countries (particularly Poland and Hungary) that 
hat.! bad a long tradition of opposition and confrontation with the socialist 
regime before its fall. Since 1 hi" conflict was "consumed" prior to the 
8 Such parlinmentary party rclaliuns were nor frozen, which can be best illus-
trated by the Bulgarian cxamplc, where processes of fragmenuuion of parliamen-
lary parties and coalitions were strongly pronounced (Brahm, 1994, 12). 
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elections, the main polarization line ran through non-communist political 
forces (Koroseoyi, 1993, SR). A large majority of the vote.' was divided 
between itlcologically and politic.1lly tlivcrgc:nt non-communist force.-; 
( K.itschelt, 1992, 34). In 1 he second elections, the polarization axis social-
ism - Hntisocialism " returned" into political life, blllt the polariza tion axis, 
which had dominated in the first elections, did not vanish. So, the major-
ity of votes in Hungary was divitlctl among three 10 four politiotl parties 
and unions. Such polarization of the eledoratc does not allow for the 
creation of a two-party "Yl>tem and it leads towards the dcvt:lopment of 
moderalc party pluralism. 
ln her second elections Croatia was left witholJt the main polarization 
:t-,i~ which had been characteristic of the first elections, but new ckavages 
between political forces were not established. The polarization axis social-
ism - antisocialism, whusc important component was the tlimeosion of 
Yugoslav-Croatiao national feelings, completely disa ppeared after the first 
elect ions due to the known reasons (aggression, wa r, disintegratio n of the 
Yugo, Jav state, and Croatian newly acquired stn1ebood). T he Crnalian 
Democratic Union, which won the fir- t election!) in 1990 with the project 
of national-state indepcnucnce, remained, figuratively speaking. i olnted on 
the political stage (KasapoviC, 1994, l R2). This wns dramatically expre sed 
in majoriry elections in which it won 90 percent of mandates, and the 
second strongest party \\CHI L7S percent or 1 out of 60 se;t l~ which was 
the main reason for its clear umlcrrcpresentalion. Proportional elections 
somewhat " lcvclb.l" the political stage but they coult.l not completely neu-
tralize the results of majority elections. 
In Russia elections were held too late for thl! cleavage socialism -
antisocialism to have tht: expected sig,uillcance. The re was nu clt:ar polari-
Vtlion of poli tica l forces around the axis re form - counterreform and it 
did not dominate Lbe elections because some political parties, blocs, 
movements and union: which were not definitely in favor of one nrie11ta-
tion found themselves between the two extremes. This lead to the seg-
mentation of partie... in Russia and nine political protagon:i!-.~ with opaque 
and changeable interrekttion-; entered tbe parliament with no clear majm-
ity and minority. Sucb a situation was fu rther complicated by the fact that 
out of nine protagonil>ts there were four to five loose coalitions and blocs 
as well as a lmost 10 pe rcen t of intlcpendent members of parliament. This 
will, definitely, lead to the creation of numen.nts fractions and ad hoc 
unions and majorities, which will not have a positive impact on the struc-
turing of the Russian party system. 
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